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Abstract 
This exploratory paper discusses a somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-
worlds theory”. The theory gives up the common assumption that all conscious experiences are features of one 
and the same world and asserts instead that different conscious subjects are associated with different “first-
personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct and “parallel” first-personal realizers of a shared 
“third-personal world”. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ 
first-personally centred worlds are all real, though only one of them is present for each subject. The relationship 
between first-personally centred and third-personal worlds can in turn be captured in a levelled ontology, where 
the first-personal level is subvenient and the third-personal supervenient. The described setup is intended to 
capture the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience without lapsing into solipsism. The paper 
also looks at some existing scientific theories of consciousness, such as integrated information theory, through 
the lens of the present metaphysical theory and discusses its implications for the hard problem of consciousness.  
1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to explore a somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: 
the “many-worlds theory”. The theory seeks to offer an account of how consciousness, in the sense 
of subjective experience, fits into the world and how it relates to other, non-subjective features. To 
capture the irreducibly subjective nature of conscious experience, the theory gives up the common 
assumption that all conscious experiences – yours, mine, and those of everyone else – are features 
of one and the same world and asserts instead that different conscious subjects are associated with 
different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct and “parallel” first-
personal realizers of a shared “third-personal world” – hence the reference to “many worlds”.   
The theory is metaphysical insofar as it is concerned with the metaphysical relationship between 
consciousness and other features. It is thus relevant to the debate about which, if any, kind of 
metaphysical dependence there is between consciousness and physical properties, and whether 
consciousness can be accommodated in a naturalistic ontology. The theory does not address the 
scientific question of what the physical and/or neural correlates of consciousness are. That question 
is important too, and different answers to it may be compatible with the metaphysical picture to be 
sketched. I will briefly comment on how some existing scientific theories of consciousness, such 
as integrated information theory, may be framed in terms of the present metaphysical picture. 
The theory is heterodox insofar as it differs from the mainstream theories in the analytic philosophy 
of consciousness. Although its motivating ideas are similar to those behind the classic critiques of 
physicalism given by Thomas Nagel, Frank Jackson, Joseph Levine, and David Chalmers,1 I am 
aware of only few contributions with which it shares some core ideas, namely some works on 
 
* This paper builds on Section 4.5 from the 2016 working paper version (http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12040/) of List 
(2019), which I did not include in the published paper due to space constraints. I presented it at a workshop on “Layers 
of Collective Intentionality”, University of Vienna, August 2018. I am grateful to the participants and especially to Luke 
Roelofs, Glenda Satne, and Hans Bernhard Schmid for helpful feedback. I also thank Kristina Musholt, Marcus Pivato, 
and Daniel Stoljar for detailed written comments and Matteo Bianchin, David Chalmers, Dean Moyar, Silvia Milano, 
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1 See, e.g., Nagel (1974), Jackson (1982), Levine (1983), and Chalmers (1996). 
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“presentism” or “subjectivism”.2 Caspar Hare and Ted Honderich, in particular, have introduced 
the notions of a “subject world” and a “subjective physical world”, respectively, which, despite 
philosophical differences, are structurally similar to the notion of a “first-personally centred world”. 
The present theory is also similar in spirit to some phenomenological theories in the tradition of 
Edmund Husserl.3 But, in its current form, the theory does not seem to have been considered yet.   
Crucially, while some earlier “presentist” theories, such as Hare’s, invite a solipsistic interpretation 
by treating only a single subject’s world as real, the many-worlds theory avoids this solipsism by 
embracing a form of modal realism with respect to first-personally centred worlds. According to 
this modal realism, different subjects’ first-personally centred worlds are all real, even though only 
one of them is present for each subject, just as different uncentred worlds are real in David Lewis’s 
modal realism, even though only one is actual.4 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I will introduce the basic challenge of explaining 
how the first-person, subjective character of conscious experience fits into the rest of the world. In 
Section 3, I will review how analytic philosophers of mind typically frame the issue and point out 
that implicit in most existing theories is a “one-world picture”. In Section 4, I will explain what I 
take to be the main shortcomings of that picture, most notably, its failure to do full justice to the 
subjective nature of conscious experience. In Sections 5 and 6, I will sketch the alternative “many-
worlds picture” and explain how it arguably avoids those shortcomings. In Section 7, I will discuss 
how what I call the “first-personal level” and the “third-personal level” are related to one another. 
In Section 8, I will revisit the “hard problem” of consciousness, and in Section 9, I will conclude. 
 
2 The closest precursors are the works by Caspar Hare (2007, 2009) on “egocentric presentism” and by Ted Honderich 
(2014) on “actualism”. Hare (2007) defines a “subject world” as “a world in which there are functionally sentient 
creatures, the experiences of one and only one of which have the monadic property of being-present” (p. 366). In note 
39, I further compare his theory with mine. Honderich (2014) writes, “being perceptually conscious now is the existence 
of a part or piece or stage of a sequence that is one subjective physical world among very many, as many as there are 
sets of perceivings of single perceivers” (p. 192), though he doesn’t develop a centred-worlds architecture and instead 
conceives of both the “objective” and the “subjective physical worlds” as being “parts” of the physical world (p. 226). 
As Jacquette (2015) notes, “[t]he exact ontology of this remarkable relation is mentioned but not further explained by 
Honderich”. Relatedly, Mark Johnston (2007) introduces the notion of an “arena of presence and action”, defined as 
a subject’s “whole centered pattern of presence, existing at a particular time, and perhaps over time” (p. 260). But he 
adds, “[t]he implied center is just a virtual center, a virtual point of convergence of perspectival modes of presentation. 
The world is not in fact centered in this way” (ibid.). Indeed, he suggests that there is no subjectivity at all: the 
appearance of subjectivity is due to the fact that things can come in different modes of presentation, but these are in a 
sense all objective, though we only “sample” some of them. Other related contributions are Kit Fine’s discussion of a 
metaphysical view he calls “first-personal realism” (2005), Benj Hellie’s “inegalitarian” approach to consciousness 
(2013), and Giovanni Merlo’s “subjectivist view of the mental” (2016). Specifically, Fine (further citing Prior 1968) 
develops a taxonomy of different forms of realism in relation to tense and/or the first person. Hellie’s “inegalitarianism” 
stresses the difference between each person’s own consciousness that is directly present to him or her and the 
consciousness of others that lacks that presence. Merlo’s subjectivism asserts that “some propositions are true 
simpliciter without being true from all points of view” (p. 318) but doesn’t involve a many-worlds structure. My 
critique of the mainstream theories is similar to Hellie’s and Merlo’s critiques, but I develop a different response. For 
a discussion of what is at stake in the debate on presentism (mainly in temporal ontology), see further Solomyak (2018). 
3 For contemporary discussions, see Gallagher and Zahavi (2015) and Zahavi (2017). Developing these connections, 
however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
4 See Lewis (1986).  
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This is a “broad strokes” paper, which will inevitably omit some qualifications, elaborations, and 
objections that some readers might like to see. There is a tradeoff between expositional simplicity 
and hedging of all the details, and my priority will be to give a sense of the many-worlds theory in 
a compact and accessible manner, rather than to offer a conclusive defence. My aim is to show 
that the theory is worthy of further consideration.5 
2. The challenge 
As conscious subjects, we are not merely biological organisms that function in certain ways and 
can be described from some external, third-person perspective, just as we describe the solar system 
or some other physical process. Rather, we ourselves experience the world from a first-person 
perspective. There is something it is like to be a conscious subject, for that subject, as Thomas 
Nagel famously puts it (and Nagel emphasizes both “be” and “for”).6 By contrast, many entities 
and systems in the world, including some fairly complex ones, have no conscious experiences. The 
weather system, an eco-system, the global economy, and a smartphone are each systems of 
considerable complexity, and yet – for all we know – there is nothing it is like to be such a system. 
Everything that can be said about these systems can be said from the outside, from a third-person 
perspective. They have no “inner life”: there is no first-person perspective attached to them. 
How, then, can we study consciousness? David Chalmers describes the explanatory challenge as 
follows:  
“The task of a science of consciousness, as I see it, is to systematically integrate two 
key classes of data into a scientific framework: third-person data, or data about 
behavior and brain processes, and first-person data, or data about subjective 
experience. When a conscious system is observed from the third-person point of view, 
a range of specific behavioral and neural phenomena present themselves. When a 
conscious system is observed from the first-person point of view, a range of specific 
subjective phenomena present themselves. Both sorts of phenomena have the status of 
data for a science of consciousness.”7    
And so, a science of consciousness must explain both. Crucially, the third-person data and the first-
person data raise very different explanatory problems. The third-person data – the data concerning 
behavioural and neural phenomena – can in principle be explained using ordinary scientific 
methodology, such as in psychology and neuroscience. The data at issue here concern, for instance, 
a subject’s wakefulness and sleep, observable attention, cognitive processing, and reasoning 
 
5 Here my expositional approach echoes that of Johnston (2007), who says (on p. 233): “In presenting the hypothesis, I 
shall not mince words; I shall write as if it is true, so that the exposition goes more smoothly. My original hope was that 
after the outrageous hypothesis had been set out, orthodoxy would be vindicated, for it then would be clear just why the 
hypothesis must be rejected. Well, it may be clear why the hypothesis should be rejected, but I must confess that it is not 
clear to me. So this is a plea for help: Here follows a hypothesis, help me to see just why it couldn’t be so!”  
6  See Nagel (1974). While I find the third-versus-first-person distinction congenial for elucidating Nagel’s 
characterization of consciousness, Nagel’s paper itself contains only some passing references to the “first person”.  
7 See Chalmers (2004, p. 1111). My framing of the challenge throughout this section draws on Chalmers (1996). 
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capacities, as well as associated patterns of neural activity. We can study all of this in much the 
same way in which we study other phenomena in science. That is, we can formulate and empirically 
test hypotheses about the relevant phenomena from an observer’s external perspective, where those 
hypotheses are expressed in third-person language, like all standard scientific hypotheses. David 
Chalmers calls the explanation of such phenomena the “easy problems of consciousness”. “Easy” 
is meant to be a relative term. Chalmers’s point is that the required explanatory strategy is not 
different in principle from the strategy we use to explain other complex phenomena in science. 
By contrast, the first-person data – the data concerning subjective experience – raise a very 
different explanatory problem. As Thomas Nagel notes: 
“[The subjective character of experience] is not captured by any of the familiar ... 
reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logically compatible with its 
absence. It is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, 
or intentional states, since these could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved 
liked people though they experienced nothing.”8 
The “hard problem of consciousness”, as Chalmers calls it, is to explain why we have first-person 
experiences at all. Why is there something it is like to be us, for us? Why are we not “zombies”: 
hypothetical systems that are behaviourally and neurally like us and indistinguishable from us by 
any external, third-person observer, but which have no first-person experiences?  
Insofar as science looks at the world from a third-person perspective, an ordinary scientific 
approach seems incapable of pinpointing the difference between such hypothetical zombies and 
us. To be sure, nobody in the debate claims that there are any zombies in the actual world, and 
even those who think that zombies are metaphysically possible tend to concede that there could 
not be zombies in the world as it is. But the question of why this is so seems to require an answer. 
If a standard third-personal scientific approach cannot give that answer, then it is unclear whether 
such an approach can satisfactorily explain first-person experience at all. Indeed, if the 
phenomenon to be explained is irreducibly first-personal, a purely third-personal approach cannot 
even adequately describe the explanandum, let alone provide a satisfactory explanation. At best, 
it seems, it can give us an account of the third-personally observable phenomena that are correlated 
with first-person experience; but that’s not the same as explaining first-person experience itself.  
There appears to be an “explanatory gap”, as Joseph Levine puts it, between what the most 
extensive third-person scientific explanation can in principle deliver, and what we need to account 
for when we are trying to explain consciousness.9 Another way of making this point is to say that 
consciousness involves not just functional properties, like other physical and biological phenomena, 
but also phenomenal (“experiential”) properties and to argue that an ordinary scientific explanation, 
given from a third-person perspective, might account for the functional properties, but not for the 
phenomenal ones. The challenge is to explain how something as inherently first-personal as 
consciousness fits into a world that science usually describes in third-personal terms. 
 
8 See Nagel (1974, p. 436). 
9 See Levine (1983).  
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3. Some standard theories and the picture implicit in them 
The standard metaphysical theories of consciousness in the analytic literature can be interpreted 
as attempts to answer the question of how physical and functional properties – roughly speaking, 
the properties studied in the sciences, ranging from physics to neuroscience and psychology – are 
related to phenomenal properties, which encode conscious experiences. Different theories can be 
characterized in terms of their positions on whether there is a gap between physical and 
phenomenal properties, and, if so, what the nature of this gap is. 
At the risk of some oversimplification, we can distinguish between five different kinds of theories:10 
Reductive or eliminative physicalist theories: Such theories deny that there is any 
gap of the suggested sort. They assert that once we have explained all the physical and 
functional properties related to consciousness – something which falls under the rubric 
of the “easy problems” – we have explained everything there is to be explained about 
consciousness. On this account, phenomenal properties – if they exist at all and are not 
merely illusory – supervene on and are reducible to physical or functional properties.11 
Non-reductive physicalist theories: Such theories accept that there is an explanatory 
gap – in the sense that the explanation of consciousness requires more than the 
explanation of physical processes and functions – but deny that there is any further gap 
of a metaphysical kind. They assert that phenomenal properties supervene on (and are 
grounded in) physical properties. The appearance of an explanatory gap is due to the 
fact that phenomenal properties are distinct from and irreducible to physical properties, 
so that, despite the supervenience relationship, explaining consciousness requires the 
use of concepts and categories distinct from those we use in physics or neuroscience.12 
Dualist theories: Such theories accept that there is both an explanatory and a 
metaphysical gap and assert that phenomenal properties do not supervene on (and are 
not grounded in) physical properties. On this picture, there is at most some weaker 
relationship between physical and phenomenal properties, such as one of nomological 
(rather than metaphysical) supervenience: relative to some contingent psycho-physical 
laws, phenomenal properties may depend on physical properties.   
Idealist theories: Such theories can be viewed as the mirror images of physicalist 
theories. They assert that there is a metaphysical dependence relationship between 
physical and phenomenal properties, but that physicalists have got its direction wrong, 
 
10 My brief overview of this theoretical landscape draws on Chalmers (1996, forthcoming). 
11 The difference between reductive and eliminative theories is that while the former merely claim that phenomenal 
properties are reducible to physical or functional properties, the latter eliminate them altogether from their ontology.   
12 There are different ways a non-reductive physicalist might spell out the nature of the gap in question. One suggestion 
would be that despite the metaphysical supervenience of phenomenal properties on physical ones, there is no relation 
of a priori entailment between the two. Another would be that phenomenal properties do not admit a finite re-
description in physical-level terms. The details do not matter for the purposes of this paper. 
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hence the appearance of an explanatory gap. It is physical properties that supervene on 
(and are grounded in) phenomenal ones, not the other way around. Idealist theories can 
also come in reductive and non-reductive forms, but I set this distinction aside.13 
Dual-aspect or Russelian monist theories: Such theories assert that what we 
conventionally call “physical” and “phenomenal” properties are two different aspects 
of a single reality. More precisely, there is a single class of fundamental properties 
grounding everything, including the “physical” and the “phenomenal” aspects of the 
world. One way to develop this idea, though not the only one, is to suggest that physics 
and the ordinary sciences only ever study relational, extrinsic, or structural properties 
while being silent on any underlying categorical, intrinsic, and non-structural 
properties, but that consciousness has to do with the latter. Further, since there could 
not be anything relational, extrinsic, or structural if there wasn’t something categorical, 
intrinsic, and non-structural, we can treat the latter properties as fundamental.  
There is much to be said about all of these theories, and it is impossible to review this rich 
theoretical landscape in detail here. What I want to note, however, is that, despite their differences, 
the various theories all have one key presupposition in common. Implicit in all of them is what I 
call a “one-world” picture. That is, they all assume:  
One world: There is a single world – the actual world – which accommodates both all 
physical phenomena and all conscious experiences (i.e., the conscious experiences of 
all the conscious subjects within that world).  
The different theories just disagree on which kinds of properties there must be in the world – which 
properties “populate” it – so as to accommodate conscious experiences along with physical 
phenomena. To illustrate this point, note that: 
• According to physicalism, whether of a reductive or non-reductive sort, the world is fully 
specified by its physical properties. All other properties, if there are any, are supervenient on 
(or grounded in) physical properties. 
• According to dualism, the world is fully specified not by its physical properties alone, but 
only by its combination of physical and phenomenal properties. Phenomenal properties do 
not supervene on (and are not grounded in) physical properties. 
• According to idealism, the world is fully specified by its phenomenal properties. All other 
properties, if there are any, are supervenient on (or grounded in) them. 
• According to other forms of monism, the world is fully specified by its fundamental properties 
of the relevant kind (and, if we take the idea of monism literally, there is just one such kind). 
Everything – both physical and phenomenal – is supervenient on (or grounded in) them. 
 
13 Indeed, one could imagine a non-reductive idealist theory according to which there is an explanatory gap of a reverse 
sort: physical properties supervene on phenomenal properties but cannot be explained in terms of them. 
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In slightly different terms, we can interpret these theories as giving us different answers to the 
question of which properties we would have to bring into existence in order to generate the world 
as it is. According to a physicalist theory, it would suffice to bring into existence the physical 
properties: they alone would be enough to generate everything there is in the world, including all 
conscious experiences. Something similar is true for other monist theories, according to which one 
would need to bring into existence only the properties of one fundamental kind in order to generate 
everything else. According to a dualist theory, by contrast, bringing into existence the properties 
of one kind alone would be insufficient: a hypothetical replica of our world that included only the 
physical properties would lack conscious beings.14  
But despite these disagreements about which kinds of properties there are and how they depend 
on each other, the basic assumption that there is a single world in which the properties in question 
are to be found is not generally in dispute. It is easy to miss the significance of that assumption. 
The one-world picture may seem so natural and self-evident – and all the action may seem to lie 
in the debate about which properties there are in that one world – that we may not just leave that 
picture unquestioned but fail to recognize it as an assumption in the first place. 
However, for reasons that I will now explain, it is far from clear that the one-world picture does 
justice to the nature of conscious experience. I will give an overview of what I take to be the main 
such reasons and will then move on to a tentative alternative proposal: the many-worlds picture. I 
do not expect every reader to be equally persuaded by each of the critical remarks that I will make. 
They are not necessarily knock-down arguments against the one-world picture, but rather critical 
considerations that may motivate us to explore the alternative picture, even if we are not yet sure 
whether we should abandon the one-world picture. I would therefore ask readers to approach the 
following discussion with an open mind. What matters ultimately is not whether the one-world 
picture can be defended against some of the criticisms – it probably can – but rather whether the 
alternative picture to be sketched offers a more compelling overall theoretical package. This is the 
question that I would like to put on the table for debate. 
4. What’s wrong with the standard picture 
So, what are the shortcomings of the one-world picture?15 First, and most importantly, by taking 
all conscious subjects’ experiences, just like all physical properties, to be features of one and the 
 
14 To illustrate how different theories can disagree about which properties populate the world, Chalmers (1996, pp. 
127–128) gives an analogy from the history of science. Compare the ontology of classical Newtonian physics, prior 
to the discovery of electromagnetic fields, with that of Maxwell’s electrodynamics. According to the former, the world 
includes only mechanical properties. According to the latter, it also includes electromagnetic properties, which do not 
supervene on mechanical properties. Maxwell’s theory thus takes the world to contain more properties than Newton’s. 
And so, if Maxwell’s theory is right, replicating the mechanical properties alone is not enough to replicate everything 
there is in the world. Electromagnetism would be missing in a purely mechanical replica of the world. To replicate the 
world according to Maxwell, we would have to replicate both the mechanical properties and the electromagnetic ones. 
15 As noted, my critique of the mainstream approaches to consciousness echoes those offered by Hellie (2013) and 
Merlo (2016), although it is framed differently and my response will also be different. I agree that the sense in which 
the one-world picture is what Hellie calls “egalitarian” doesn’t fully capture the nature of conscious experience. Merlo 
points out, relatedly, that the mainstream view does not adequately account for the unity of consciousness, the contents 
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same world, the one-world picture does not fully capture the inherently perspectival, first-person, 
and subjective character of conscious experience. The one-world picture lacks the resources to tell 
us in structural terms what the source of the subjectivity of conscious experiences is. When asked 
why some properties – so-called “physical” ones – correspond to objective features of the world 
while other properties – so-called “phenomenal” ones – correspond to subjective features, the one-
world picture can only give a rather stipulative answer and assert that this is how it is.16 In effect, the 
one-world picture is still a third-personal picture of the world: a picture of the world as it would 
be seen from an Olympian perspective, the “view from nowhere”, as Nagel calls it.17 Even though 
this third-personally described world is said to be populated by both “physical” and “phenomenal” 
properties, it is not clear how we get anything genuinely first-personal and subjective out of it.18 
Secondly, the one-world picture does not capture the centrality of the subject within any conscious 
experience. There is a sense in which each of us, as a conscious subject, finds him- or herself at 
the centre of his or her conscious experiences. The one-world picture does not really account for 
this “subject-centredness”. Indeed, the very notion of “the subject” or “the self” has remained 
elusive in the analytic philosophy of mind. It is widely accepted that there isn’t any good support 
for treating “the subject” or “the self” as an entity on a par with other more familiar entities such 
as organisms, rocks, and armchairs. The ontological inventory of the world as supported by science 
does not include any such thing as “the subject” or “the self”. Yet, the intuition that our conscious 
experiences are somehow “centred” around us as subjects remains powerful. 
Thirdly, and relatedly, if I ask the (I think reasonable) question of why I am having my conscious 
experiences rather than those of someone else, the one-world picture can’t give me an answer. It 
can’t even point to any indexical fact in response to that question, such as the fact that I am who I 
am, because no such indexical fact holds at the world simpliciter; it holds only relative to me. The 
world as such, as depicted by the one-world picture, is not endowed with any “centre” at which I, 
as the subject, am located. Benj Hellie makes a similar point. He notes that the picture of 
consciousness defended by David Chalmers and others leaves an important question open. He begins 
 
of self-awareness, and experiential knowledge. A philosopher who has criticized the “one-world” picture of ontology 
more generally, albeit from a very different angle, is Gabriel (2015), who argues that the world as such does not exist.  
16 Among the theories of consciousness based on the one-world picture, the ones that are perhaps best placed to 
respond to this criticism are those that assert that conscious experiences have to do with intrinsic or categorical 
properties, while physical and functional phenomena have to do with extrinsic or relational properties. Even so, given 
the one-world assumption, those theories in effect imply that the “locus” at which facts of conscious experience hold 
is the same as the “locus” at which ordinary physical or functional facts hold: namely the world simpliciter.   
17 See Nagel (1986). 
18 One might object that if the world is third-personally such that Christian feels hungry, then we can easily get something 
first-personal out of this: it will follow that “I feel hungry” holds for Christian. But the fact that I feel hungry holds only 
relative to the first-personal fact that I am Christian. “I feel hungry” does not hold at the world simpliciter, without this 
subject relativization. Another way of making this point is to say that the third-personal proposition “Christian feels 
hungry” entails the first-personal proposition “I feel hungry” only in the presence of a first-personal premise, namely that 
“I am Christian”. (This can be made precise by noting that the content of a third-personal proposition such as “Christian 
feels hungry” can be captured by a set of possible worlds simpliciter, while the content of a first-personal proposition 
such as “I feel hungry” needs to be captured by a set of centred worlds; more on this later.) 
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by calling himself the “Hellie-subject” and asks why he, Benj Hellie, has the conscious experiences 
of the “Hellie-subject” rather than those of someone else, such as the “Chalmers-subject”: 
“[A] vertiginous question is right around the corner. The Hellie-subject: why is it me? 
Why is it the one whose pains are ‘live’, whose volitions are mine, about whom self-
interested concern makes sense? … Granted that the Hellie-subject is acquainted with 
a certain class of phenomenal properties: if that subject is acquainted with right-arm 
pain, then I will feel right-arm pain … But of course the Chalmers-subject is also 
acquainted with a certain class of phenomenal properties: if that subject is acquainted 
with left-arm pain, then Chalmers will feel left-arm pain and I might not. So facts about 
which subjects are acquainted with what cannot answer our question. Why should the 
acquaintance-relations of the Hellie-subject rather than those of the Chalmers-subject 
be the ones relevant to what I feel?”19 
Again, the problem is that even if the world is populated not just by physical properties but also 
by phenomenal ones, the one-world picture remains an essentially third-personal picture. 
Fourthly, the one-world picture is not particularly well placed to account for what is often 
described as the unity of consciousness. Why do some phenomenal properties jointly constitute a 
unified experience, while others, such as those associated with different subjects, are unconnected 
to one another? As Giovanni Merlo puts the question, “what makes certain mental states … 
coalesce into a single mental life: what is the ‘glue’ that keeps together my beliefs and my hopes, 
my desires and my fears, my feelings and my experiences?”20 The one-world picture has a hard 
time explaining in structural terms what makes each person’s conscious experiences seem unified 
to that person: belonging to a single subjective perspective.21  
Fifthly, the one-world picture does not satisfactorily capture the way in which others’ conscious 
experiences are first-personally inscrutable to us. By “first-person inscrutability” of others’ 
experiences, I mean that although we can construct a third-personal theory of another person’s 
mind and/or empathize with them through our own first-person experiences, we can’t step into 
another subject’s first-person perspective itself. This is an instance of the familiar problem of 
“other minds”. Indeed, as is generally acknowledged, we cannot have certainty about the presence 
of conscious experiences in others at all. My attribution of conscious experiences to others always 
involves an inferential leap of faith, even though the inference is a reasonable one.22 
 
19 See Hellie (2013, p. 309–310). 
20 See Merlo (2016, p. 333). 
21 One might try to explain the unity of consciousness in a one-world framework by pointing out that a unified 
consciousness serves the useful role of creating a “global workspace” in which information from multiple sources is 
integrated and made available for use by different cognitive processes (Baars 1988, 2003). While this may be a functional 
explanation of the unity of consciousness from a third-person perspective, it arguably does not explain the first-person 
experience of unity. Conceivably, an information-processing system could play the functional role of pooling and 
integrating information from multiple sources so as to create a “global workspace” without giving rise to any unified 
experience. A zombie in Chalmers’s sense could still have a “global workspace” in information-processing terms. 
22 One might say that skepticism about others’ conscious experiences is no harder to reject than skepticism about the 
external world in general. Insofar as we usually reject the latter, we should also reject the former. However, the two 
 10 
Finally, the one-world picture does not fully clarify what is distinctive about phenomenal properties 
and why the hard problem of consciousness is hard.23 The debate about the hard problem – and 
relatedly about whether zombies are conceivable and/or metaphysically possible – has reached an 
impasse, and there is still no agreed diagnosis of what it would take to make progress in that debate. 
These shortcomings of the one-world picture, I think, motivate the exploration of an alternative 
picture, even if one is not yet convinced that one should abandon the one-world picture in the end. 
5. An alternative picture  
My starting point, as noted, is the observation that if we take the “locus” of conscious experiences 
to be “the world simpliciter”, then we fail to capture the perspectival, first-person, and subjective 
character of consciousness. The core idea of the alternative picture to be explored is the following: 
Many worlds: The “locus” of each subject’s conscious experiences is not the world 
as such, in some third-personal sense, but a subject-specific “first-personally centred 
world”. The first-personally centred worlds of different subjects can, in turn, be viewed 
as distinct and “parallel” first-personal realizers of a shared “third-personal world”. If 
the third-personal world admits more than one conscious subject (as we usually 
assume), then there can be many first-personally centred worlds. For each subject, one 
of them is “actual” or “present”.24 
To explain this idea, let me begin with the notion of a third-personal world. A “third-personal 
world” can be defined as the totality of all facts that hold at that world from a third-personal 
perspective. We can think of a “third-personal fact” as a fact that would feature in a complete 
description of the relevant world from the perspective of an omniscient Olympian observer 
studying the world from some “objective” perspective – the “view from nowhere” in Nagel’s terms.  
The present definition is a version of Wittgenstein’s famous dictum “[t]he world is everything that 
is the case”, which he further clarifies by adding “[t]he world is the totality of facts, not of 
things”. 25  Amending Wittgenstein’s wording, we might say: “the third-personal world is 
everything that is the case third-personally”, where “something that is the case third-personally” 
is a “third-personal fact”.  
For example, a third-personal world includes all the facts about all the physical entities and 
properties in that world and their configurations relative to one another, as well as all the facts that 
 
forms of skepticism are distinct, and one could consistently accept the existence of the external world while denying 
the existence of others’ consciousness; this would be a form of solipsism. Many will intuitively feel that our epistemic 
access to others’ conscious experiences is somehow more indirect than our epistemic access to the external world. 
Notably, there can never be a single unified perspective from which different subjects’ experiences are simultaneously 
first-personally accessible. For related points, see Merlo’s discussion of “experiential knowledge” (2016, section 5.3). 
23 Again, perhaps the qualifications from note 16 apply. 
24 I should note that the idea of “many worlds” has previously been invoked in discussions of consciousness in the 
context of quantum mechanics, but usually in a very different way. I briefly return to this at the end of the paper. 
25 See Wittgenstein (1922). 
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supervene upon those “physical” facts. (I assume that any facts that supervene on third-personal 
facts are themselves third-personal.) If there are biological organisms such as humans in the world, 
then the third-personal facts will include all facts about their brains, bodies, and behaviour – even 
all facts about their psychology and cognition, to the extent that these can be described from a 
third-person perspective – as well as all the facts about their environments. All those facts would 
presumably feature in a complete description of the relevant world from an Olympian perspective. 
At the same time, a third-personal world does not determine any “first-personal facts”. By a “first-
personal fact”, I mean a fact that holds only from a first-person perspective. Examples are the fact 
that I am in a particular experiential state, the fact that I am having Christian’s conscious 
experiences rather than those of someone else, or the fact that some object is present to me in a 
particular way. In his discussion of “first-personal realism”, Kit Fine also recognizes such facts. 
He writes: “The first‐personal realist believes that there are distinctively first‐personal facts. 
Reality is not exhausted by the ‘objective’ or impersonal facts but also includes facts that reflect a 
first‐person point of view”.26 First-personal facts are left indeterminate by “the world as such” and 
are fully determined only relative to a particular subjective perspective. First-personal facts, such 
as the fact that I am seeing an illuminated computer screen in front of me, must not be confused 
with certain corresponding third-personal facts, such as the fact that Christian is seeing such a 
screen. How exactly a subject’s first-personal perspective is related to a given third-personal world 
– say, where I fit into the world, or indeed whether there are any first-personal facts at all – is left 
open by the third-personal world. These questions go beyond third-personal facts. 
David Lewis makes a structurally analogous point, albeit in relation to a subtly different issue: 
“Consider the case of the two gods. They inhabit a certain possible world, and they 
know exactly which world it is. Therefore they know every proposition that is true at 
their world. Insofar as knowledge is a propositional attitude [with third-personal 
content], they are omniscient. Still I can imagine them to suffer ignorance: neither one 
knows which of the two he is.”27  
Although Lewis’s topic here is indexicality and de se belief, not first-person experience, his quote 
illustrates the point that some facts, such as how I fit into the world or what I experience, are left 
open by a third-personal world. Even if I knew the totality of third-personal facts that hold at the 
world as depicted by the one-world picture, but lacked any first-personal information, my third-
personal knowledge by itself would not allow me to infer my own first-personal perspective on 
the world. The first-personal facts are under-determined by the third-personal ones, just as the 
indexical facts are under-determined by the non-indexical ones. 
 
26 See Fine (2005, p. 311). 
27 See Lewis (1979, p. 520). Lewis uses examples such as this one to argue that the contents of an agent’s beliefs cannot 
generally be captured by ordinary propositions that the agent takes to be true (where a proposition is a set of possible 
worlds), but must be expressed by self-ascribed properties (where a property is a set of individuals). For instance, to 
believe that one is located on mountain A rather than on mountain B is to self-ascribe the property whose extension is 
the set of all individuals (actual and possible) on mountain A. This is essentially equivalent to taking the content of 
any belief to be a set of centred worlds, as discussed below. For a recent discussion, see Jackson and Stoljar (2019). 
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To place a subject inside the world, we need to specify something above and beyond the third-
personal world, namely a first-personal perspective on it. I call this a “locus of subjectivity”.28 We 
can think of it as an additional ontological ingredient needed in order to determine all first-personal 
facts. Let me use the letter w to denote the third-personal world (“omega” for “world”) and the 
letter p to denote a locus of subjectivity (“pi” for “perspective”). We can then define a “first-
personally centred world” as an ordered pair áw,pñ consisting of a third-personal world w and a 
locus of subjectivity p.29 
Formally, this definition is an instance of the standard definition of a “centred world”: a world 
paired with some “location” or “centre”.30 However, centred worlds are usually interpreted in a 
thinner way than required for present purposes: centres are often understood simply as spatio-
temporal coordinates, akin to the dot indicating your current location on your smartphone map, or 
alternatively as specific individuals in the world. Centres in this conventional sense – basically, 
locational coordinates or pointers to who you are – may not be rich enough to fix a subject’s full 
conscious perspective on the world – or even if they were, this would be a substantive claim that 
we shouldn’t presuppose from the outset. More than one distinct stream of conscious experience 
might be compatible with occupying the same centre in the world, at least on a thin understanding 
of what a centre is. Plausibly, for example, the total facts about the third-personal world, together 
with my location pointer as picked up by my smartphone’s global-positioning system, still under-
determine my conscious experiences.31  
I therefore interpret “centres” in a thicker way here, as indicated by the term “locus of subjectivity”. 
I take any such “locus” to encode a subject’s entire first-person perspective on the world. This 
must be specified as richly as needed in order to ensure that any first-personally centred world in 
which the given locus of subjectivity occurs – i.e., any pairing of it with a third-personal world – 
leaves no first-personal facts underspecified. The facts to be fixed must include, in particular, all 
of the relevant subject’s phenomenal experiences at that world. The ordered pair áw,pñ thus encodes 
the totality of facts that hold at the world w with p placed inside it as the locus of subjectivity.   
Returning to Wittgenstein’s characterization of “the world” once again, we might say that “a 
subject’s first-personally centred world is everything that is the case relative to that subject”.  
Crucially, this includes both 
 
28 The term also appears in Fine (2005), but not with the exact same meaning. 
29 As noted, this is structurally similar to Hare’s (2007, 2009) notion of a “subject world”. It also echoes Honderich’s 
(2014) notion of a “subjective physical world”, though Honderich doesn’t make the connection with centred worlds.  
30 Centred worlds go back to Quine (1969) and Lewis (1979). 
31 Chalmers (1996, p. 144) argues that a centred world, in the standard thin sense, would be insufficient to capture a 
subject’s full first-personal perspective, including his or her phenomenal experience. He writes: “indexicals [whose 
content may be represented by a set of centred worlds] accompany facts about conscious experience in their failure to 
supervene logically on physical facts, but they are all settled by the addition of a thin ‘indexical fact’ about the location 
of the agent in question. But even when we give [the agent] perfect knowledge about her indexical relation to 
everything in the physical world, her knowledge of [e.g.] red experiences will not be improved in the slightest. In 
lacking phenomenal knowledge, she lacks far more than someone lacking indexical knowledge.” See also Chalmers 
and Jackson (2001). These observations underline the need to adopt a richer interpretation of a locus of subjectivity. 
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• the totality of third-personal facts that would feature in a complete and exhaustive third-
personal description of the world the subject inhabits, and 
• the totality of first-personal facts that hold relative to the subject: how the subject relates to 
the world, what the subject feels and experiences, and so on. 
So, a first-personally centred world áw,pñ encodes everything that is encoded by the third-personal 
world w plus everything that is the case at w relative to the locus of subjectivity p. Note that this 
notion is an ontic notion, not an epistemic one. My first-personally centred world áw,pñ includes  
• not just those facts of which I have knowledge or awareness,   
• but all the facts that hold at áw,pñ, which may include facts of which I am oblivious.  
This ontic rather than epistemic understanding of a first-personally centred world is important. 
After all, our goal is to provide an account of what the ontology of the world must be in order to 
accommodate both objective and subjective features. This must subsume everything that is the 
case, both third-personally and first-personally. We are not merely providing an account of the 
features of the world the subject knows. Of course, facts about what the subject knows will be 
among the facts that hold relative to the subject, but they do not exhaust them. 
On the present account, we must think of conscious experience not as something that is located at 
the third-personal world, but as something that occurs only at a first-personally centred world. To 
say that I am conscious, on this picture, is to say that some first-personally centred world is “actual” 
or “present” for me. I am implying that I am conscious as soon as I acknowledge that some first-
personally centred world is actual or present for me, just as – in the more familiar third-personal 
case – we are implying that some third-personal truths hold (at a minimum, tautological ones) once 
we accept that there is an actual world. Another way of making this point is to say that we should 
not treat consciousness as a property whose mode and locus of instantiation are on a par with those 
of a physical property. Rather, I would suggest – echoing some phenomenologists – that 
consciousness is tied to a first-personal “mode of being”:32 my consciousness is grounded in there 
being a first-personally centred world that is present or actual for me. 
The totality of facts that hold at the first-personally centred world áw,pñ can be usefully partitioned 
into three categories: 
Pure third-personal facts: These are facts settled by the third-personal world w alone. 
This implies that, for any two distinct loci of subjectivity, p and p', that might be paired 
with w, any such fact holds at áw,pñ if and only if it holds at áw,p'ñ. Pure third-personal 
facts are invariant under changes in the locus of subjectivity. In that sense, they can be 
said to be fully “objective”. 
 
32 The notion of a “mode of being” was discussed by Heidegger (1927). Using this terminology, one might say: 
consciousness is not simply a property of a being, but rather a mode of being (or an aspect thereof). But I do not here 
commit myself to any further ideas from Heidegger’s (controversial) philosophy. 
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Pure first-personal facts: These are facts settled by the locus of subjectivity p alone. 
This implies that, for any two distinct third-personal worlds, w and w', with which that 
same locus of subjectivity p might be paired (if any), any such fact holds at áw,pñ if 
and only if it holds at áw',pñ. Pure first-personal facts are invariant under changes in 
the third-personal world. In that sense, they can be said to be fully “subjective”. 
Mixed facts: These are facts settled only by the combination of the third-personal 
world w and the locus of subjectivity p. This implies that the question of whether or 
not any such fact holds at the first-personally centred world áw,pñ depends not only on 
the third-personal world w but also on the locus of subjectivity p. An example may be 
the fact that the world, or something in the world, is present to me in a particular way 
or that I relate to the world in such-and-such a way – whether locationally, attitudinally, 
or perceptually. The present category of facts thus includes ordinary indexical facts.  
My mentioning of indexical facts might invite the following objection. By defining a first-
personally centred world in a way that is analogous to a centred world in the literature on 
indexicality and de se content, so the objection goes, I run the risk of conflating the problem of 
conscious experience with that of indexicality. After all, centred worlds – in the standard sense of 
an ordered pair of a world and a “centre” or spatio-temporal location marker – are key formal tools 
to represent indexical content.33 My response to this objection is this. I accept that we should not 
think of phenomenal experience as being the same as indexicality. Not every indexical fact needs 
to be a phenomenal fact of the sort characteristic of conscious experience. The fact that I am in 
London right now is indexical, but arguably, it is not by itself a phenomenal fact. However, while 
not every indexical fact needs to be a phenomenal fact as conventionally construed, I would make 
two points. First, phenomenal consciousness is an indexical phenomenon. As I have emphasized, 
conscious experiences do not occur third-personally, at the world simpliciter, but first-personally, 
for a particular subject, and thus at a world that is centred around a first-person perspective. So, it 
should be no surprise that the formal framework needed to represent conscious experience is 
structurally similar to the formal framework needed to represent indexicality.34  
Second, even ordinary indexical facts, such as the fact that I am in London right now, do not hold 
at the world simpliciter, without some subject for whom those facts hold. In that sense, indexicality 
presupposes a form of subjectivity. In a world without subjects, there could not be any genuine 
instantiated indexicality. Imagine a universe without any subjects. There can certainly be all sorts 
of third-personal facts in such a universe, but just as there would not be any phenomenal facts in 
the absence of any subjects for whom they hold, there could be no any indexical facts either. At 
most, we might say: such-and-such indexical fact would hold if one were to occupy a particular 
 
33 For recent discussions, see, e.g., Liao (2012) and Milano (2018). 
34 I should note that indexicality can itself be represented in different ways. Consider the indexical “I am in London”. 
One could locate its indexicality either in its content (by taking the content to be a centred proposition, i.e., a set of 
centred worlds, centred around an individual in London) or in the mode with which the content is represented (by 
taking the content to be an uncentred proposition, such as “Christian is in London”, but taking that content to be 
represented in a special mode). The structural parallel between my treatment of consciousness and treatments of 
indexicality arises when one opts for the content approach to indexicals (rather than the mode approach). 
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place or time in that universe. But no such indexical fact would hold simpliciter – “monadically” 
and not just relative to some hypothetical centre that is actually unoccupied. It seems that a subject-
free universe – one not paired with an occupied centre – has no room for monadically instantiated 
indexical facts. By contrast, the fact that I am in London right now holds monadically in my first-
personally centred world.35 
I am open to the suggestion that consciousness is, in some sense, a special case of indexicality.36 
First-personally centred worlds can be viewed as sufficiently enriched refinements of centred 
worlds as understood in the literature on indexicality.37  The structural parallels between my 
account of consciousness and the established accounts of indexicality should therefore be a 
welcome feature of my approach, not a bug. 
It is also worth saying a little more about why the present picture is best viewed as a many-worlds 
picture of consciousness, and not simply as a one-centred-world picture. Unless we wish to accept 
a strong form of solipsism, we may reasonably assume that the same third-personal world can be 
paired with different loci of subjectivity which correspond to different conscious subjects.38 
Suppose w is the actual third-personal world and p and p' are two possible loci of subjectivity, 
which represent your subjective perspective and mine, respectively. Then the ordered pairs áw,pñ 
and áw,p'ñ are each possible first-personally centred worlds, one of which is actual or present for 
me, while the other is actual or present for you. This means that, in a sense, you and I “inhabit” 
different worlds, and there is no “first-personal world simpliciter” – one that we all share: you, I, 
and everyone else. Rather, as conscious subjects, we live, in effect, in parallel first-personally 
centred worlds. Of course, our physical organisms and all other features of our physical 
environment exist in a shared third-personal world. The third-personal facts instantiated at each of 
our first-personal worlds coincide. But the first-personal facts are different. 
The best interpretation of all of this – and certainly the best non-solipsistic one – seems to be a 
many-worlds interpretation. On this interpretation, there are many parallel first-personally centred 
worlds, all of which are real in some appropriate modal sense, but only one of which is present for 
each subject. This picture is analogous to David Lewis’s realism about possible worlds, albeit 
applied to the case of first-personally centred worlds, rather than third-personal ones. In the case 
 
35 I have here benefitted from Hare’s (2007, 2009) distinction between “monadic” and “relational” senses of presence. 
One might say: at a world that isn’t paired with a centre, indexical facts can hold at most relationally (relative to some 
centre that isn’t fixed by the world itself), but not monadically. At a centred world, indexical facts can hold monadically. 
36 I am grateful to Silvia Milano for a helpful discussion of this point.   
37 While the indexical fact that I am in London right now under-determines my conscious experiences, and the p-
component of my first-personally centred world alone (without the w-component) under-determines my relationship 
with the third-personal world, the entire first-personally centred world that is present for me – the pair áw,pñ – does 
determine all indexical facts that hold for me, along with all other first-personal and third-personal facts. On this 
picture, a first-personally centred world determines not just all of the subject’s conscious experiences, together with 
all third-personal facts about the surrounding environment, but also all indexical facts that hold for that subject. 
38 In principle, different loci of subjectivity could also be interpreted as encoding different perspectives that the same 
subject could have on the world at different points in time. My formal definitions do not rule out such an interpretation. 
But just as the third-personal world w is best interpreted as being temporally extended, so each locus of subjectivity p 
may also be best interpreted as being temporally extended.  
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of first-personally centred worlds, this modal realism seems justified, provided we do not wish to 
accept solipsism.39 (Whether a similar modal realism is also justified in relation to third-personal 
worlds is a separate question that I set aside here.) 
This completes my first sketch of the many-worlds picture of consciousness. Of course, more 
needs to be said about the metaphysical relationship between third-personal worlds and first-
personally centred worlds. Before I turn to this, however, I would like to explain briefly how the 
many-worlds picture avoids the problems I have identified with the one-world picture. 
6. How the many-worlds picture avoids the identified problems 
My first criticism of the one-world picture was that, by taking all conscious subjects’ experiences, 
just like all physical properties, to be features of one and the same world, the picture does not fully 
capture the perspectival, first-person, and subjective character of conscious experience. As should 
be clear, the many-worlds picture avoids this problem by associating each subject with a subject-
specific first-personally centred world. It thus implies that the locus of consciousness is not “the 
world simpliciter”, but a first-personally centred world, a world that is centred around a “locus of 
subjectivity”. In this way, the many-worlds picture accommodates the perspectival, first-personal, 
and subjective character of consciousness. 
My second criticism of the one-world picture was that it does not capture the centrality of the 
subject within any conscious experience. Moreover, I noted that the very notion of “the subject” 
has remained elusive in the analytic philosophy of mind. Since we have no good reason to treat 
“the subject” as an entity on a par with other entities in our ontology, it seems reasonable to avoid 
any reification of “the subject”. But how do we account for the apparent “subject-centredness” of 
our conscious experience?  I think the many-worlds picture can say something useful here. On the 
one hand, the picture implies that we should not treat consciousness as something that occurs at 
the world simpliciter, and it does not treat “the subject” as an entity in that world. On the other 
hand, it still includes “the subject” as a building block of our ontology, via the concept of a “locus 
of subjectivity” that is a key constituent of a first-personally centred world. Crucially, however, a 
“locus of subjectivity” is best viewed, not as an entity, but as a “locus of being” – or as constituting 
 
39 See Lewis (1986). Honderich’s (2014) understanding of “subjective physical worlds” has a many-worlds flavour, too, 
though he also suggests that “objective” and “subjective physical worlds” are “parts” of a single physical world. It is 
also worth comparing the present many-worlds picture with Hare’s “egocentric presentist” theory. Hare defines the 
notion of a “system of subject worlds (S-worlds)”. This is “a set of physically identical S-worlds such that for any 
functionally sentient creature in an S-world in the set, there is an S-world in the set in which that very creature has 
present experiences” (2007, pp. 366–367). If we think of that set as containing all the distinct first-personally centred 
worlds that are deemed real on the present modal realist picture, then Hare’s theory is structurally similar to mine. Yet, 
Hare’s theory is more solipsistic. He emphasizes that “an egocentric presentist believes that only one subject world 
exists. There are no other subject worlds” (2009, p. 41), thereby apparently rejecting a modal realist interpretation. He 
also argues that one should not take this solipsism too far. He writes: “egocentric presentism is quite neutral about 
what sorts of things there are. To say that the world is a subject world is just to say that, of the things there are, some 
of them are monadically present, and there is a sentient creature with all and only those things as perceptual objects. 
This in no way threatens the … idea that many people exist, and they are all equally real … People are not any more 
or less real, fleshy or concrete for having or failing to have monadically present perceptual objects” (2009, p. 42). 
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a “locus of being” in conjunction with the third-personal world with which it is paired. In short, 
“the subject” is not an entity – either in the third-personal world or in the first-personally centred 
world – but a locus around which a first-personally centred world is centred.40 
My third criticism of the one-world picture was that it lacks the resources to address the question 
of why I am having my conscious experiences rather than those of someone else: the “vertiginous 
question”, as Benj Hellie calls it. According to the one-world picture, there is no fact that holds at 
the world simpliciter which could settle that question. By contrast, the many-worlds picture has no 
difficulties answering the vertiginous question. Given the indexical nature of the question, any 
answer to it must point to a fact that isn’t purely third-personal. If the locus of my conscious 
experiences is indeed a first-personally centred world, then I am able to point to such a fact. There 
is a first-personal fact that holds at my first-personally centred world to the effect that I am having 
my conscious experiences rather than anyone else’s. 
My fourth criticism of the one-world picture was that it is not well placed to account for the unity 
of consciousness. Why do some phenomenal properties belong to a unified conscious perspective, 
while others belong to distinct perspectives? The many-worlds picture implies that what makes 
different first-personal facts belong to the same first-personal perspective is the fact that they hold 
at the same first-personally centred world. The unifying feature of all the phenomenal facts that 
constitute my conscious experiences is that they all hold at my first-personally centred world. The 
unifying feature of all the facts that constitute your conscious experiences is that they all hold at 
your first-personally centred world. To be sure, this does not settle all questions about the unity of 
consciousness. For instance, not every fact that holds at my first-personally centred world would 
qualify as a phenomenal fact experienced by me. We may need to say more about which facts – 
among those that hold at my first-personally centred world – count as phenomenal facts. Even so, 
by locating conscious experiences at first-personally centred worlds, the present picture offers 
some structural resources for capturing the unity of consciousness. 
My fifth criticism of the one-world picture was that it does not satisfactorily explain why the 
conscious experiences of others are first-personally inscrutable to us. Why is it impossible to gain 
direct epistemic access to the first-person experiences of others? The many-worlds picture gives 
us a principled answer to this question. The conscious experiences of others are located at distinct 
first-personally centred worlds, which are not present to us. Only my own first-personally centred 
world is present to me, and the facts about others’ conscious experiences are not located at that 
world. Any references that I am making to the conscious experiences of others are therefore – in 
some sense – references to certain “parallel” worlds, distinct from my own: namely the first-
personally centred worlds of different subjects. 
 
40 Relatedly, Fine (2005, p. 312) distinguishes between the “metaphysical self” and the “empirical self”. He describes 
the former as “the implicit subject of the egocentric facts”: “it might be regarded as the locus of subjectivity, since it 
is relative to such a self that the egocentric facts will obtain”. And he describes the latter as “the explicit subject of 
non‐egocentric facts”. Arguably, only the latter but not the former can be an entity of an ordinary sort in the world.  
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My final criticism of the one-world picture was that it doesn’t give us a fully compelling diagnosis 
of why exactly the hard problem of consciousness is hard. I will return to this issue in Section 8, 
when I revisit the hard problem of consciousness. 
I should emphasize that, just as my objections to the one-world picture weren’t intended as 
definitive knock-down arguments but as motivating reasons for considering an alternative picture, 
so my brief explanations as to why the many-worlds picture avoids the identified problems should 
also be viewed as exploratory and tentative. There is no doubt that more work will need to be done 
on each of the issues raised. 
7. The relationship between the third-personal and the first-personal levels 
What does the present picture imply for the debate about what, if any, metaphysical dependence 
there is between consciousness and physical features of the world? How, in particular, should we 
think about the metaphysical relationship between third-personal worlds and first-personally 
centred worlds? I want to suggest that we can associate third-personal worlds and first-personally 
centred worlds with two different ontological levels. Crucially, I will argue, the level of first-
personally centred worlds is subvenient and the level of third-personal worlds supervenient – not 
the other way around. This is consistent with the rejection of physicalism by philosophers such as 
David Chalmers, but goes a step further, by rejecting the one-world picture too.  
To explain this, I need to say more about the notion of “ontological levels”. It is often said that the 
world is stratified into levels. For instance, we commonly distinguish between the level of physics, 
the level of chemistry, the level of biology, the level of psychology, and so on. In a levelled 
ontology, different levels can be associated with different classes of facts. The physical facts are 
distinct from the chemical facts, which are distinct from the biological facts, and so on. At the 
same time, we can recognize certain relationships of metaphysical dependence between different 
levels. For instance, the biological level plausibly supervenes on the physical, in that the totality 
of physical facts is sufficient to determine the biological facts. Some levels stand in such a 
relationship to each other, while others don’t. To illustrate, the geological level and the biological 
level are probably unrelated to each other by supervenience, but each supervenes on the physical. 
Generally, a levelled ontology can be represented by an ordered pair áL,Sñ, where L is the class of 
all “levels” in that ontology (e.g., physical, chemical, biological, and so on) and S is the class of all 
“supervenience mappings” between levels.41 Each such mapping has a “source level” and a “target 
level”, and the existence of a mapping from one level (its source) to another (its target) means that 
the target level supervenes on the source.42 So, the source level is the subvenient one, and the target 
level is the supervenient one. Of course, not all pairs of levels need to be related by supervenience.  
 
41 I have developed this formalism in List (2019). 
42 Supervenience is further assumed to be (i) reflexive, i.e., for each level in L, there is a (trivial) supervenience 
mapping from that level to itself in S; (ii) transitive, i.e., whenever S contains a mapping from one level to a second, 
and a mapping from the second level to a third, then it also contains a mapping from the first level to the third; and 
(iii) unique, i.e., S never contains more than one mapping from one given level to another given level. 
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The present formalism can be spelt out further by identifying each level with the set of all possible 
worlds at that level. A “possible world at a particular level” is simply a possible specification of 
the totality of facts at that level. For instance, the physical level can be identified with the set Wphys, 
where each element of Wphys represents one possible way the totality of physical facts could be. 
Similarly, the chemical level can be identified with the set Wchem, where each element of Wchem 
represents one possible way the totality of chemical facts could be. We can interpret the elements 
of Wphys as possible worlds at the level of physics, and we can interpret the elements of Wchem as 
possible worlds at the level of chemistry. Now, to say that the chemical level supervenes on the 
physical is simply to say that there is a mapping in S from Wphys to Wchem which assigns to each 
physical-level world the chemical-level world that supervenes on it.  
Supervenience mappings are:  
• “surjective”, in the sense that, for each world at the supervenient (target) level, there is at 
least one world at the subvenient (source) level which is mapped to it, and  
• (at least typically) “many-to-one”, in the sense that more than one world at the subvenient 
(source) level may be mapped to the same world at the supervenient (target) level.  
Applied to the example of the physical and chemical levels, the “surjectivity” condition captures 
the idea that every chemical-level world has at least one possible “physical realizer”, where a 
“realizer” of the chemical-level world is a physical-level world that gives rise to it. And the “many-
to-one” condition captures the idea that a chemical-level world may be “multiply realizable” at the 
physical level: more than configuration of the physical facts can give rise to the same body of 
chemical facts. 
With these definitions in place, let me return to the many-worlds picture of consciousness. My 
claim is that we can associate third-personal worlds and first-personally centred worlds with two 
different ontological levels. Let W3rd denote the set of all possible third-personal worlds, and let 
W1st denote the set of all possible first-personally centred worlds. As defined earlier, each third-
personal world, of the form w, is a full-specification of all third-personal facts, and each first-
personally centred world, of the form áw,pñ, is a third-personal world paired with a locus of 
subjectivity. Depending on the intended interpretation, we can interpret the sets W3rd and W1st either 
as sets of metaphysically possible worlds of the relevant kinds or as sets of nomologically possible 
worlds. Suppose we take L to contain W3rd and W1st, and we take S to contain a mapping that 
assigns to each first-personally centred world áw,pñ the third-personal world w. Then the ordered 
pair áL,Sñ is an instance of a levelled ontology as I have formally defined it.   
Now, insofar as the relevant supervenience mapping has W1st as its source level and W3rd as its 
target level, the first-personal level qualifies as the subvenient one and the third-personal as the 
supervenient. This should not be surprising, given that first-personally centred worlds encode 
strictly more facts than third-personal worlds. Each first-personally centred world, by being an 
ordered pair of the form áw,pñ, encodes both third-personal and first-personal facts. In fact, we can 
think of any first-personally centred world áw,pñ as a “first-personal realizer” of the third-personal 
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world w. If, as I have assumed, different loci of subjectivity – p, p', p'', and so on – can be 
compatible with the same third-personal world w, we can think of the third-personal world w as 
being “multiply realizable” at the first-personal level. Indeed, on this picture, we may say that 
whenever a new conscious being comes into existence, such as a new-born human, this means that 
there will be a new first-personal realizer of the third-personal world. Each new site of conscious 
experiences thus gives rise to a new way the third-personal world may be first-personally realized. 
Note, further, that as third-personal facts do not depend on the locus of subjectivity at all, we can 
treat third-personal facts as holding at the third-personal level simpliciter, while first-personal facts 
(both of the “pure” and of the “mixed” sorts introduced earlier) hold only at the first-personal level. 
In that sense, third-personal and first-personal facts may be said to “reside” at different levels.  
In addition to recognizing that there is a supervenience relationship between the first-personal and 
third-personal levels, we can also make sense of the idea of a psycho-physical law within this 
framework. Given that each first-personally centred world is an ordered pair áw,pñ consisting of a 
third-personal world w and a locus of subjectivity p, the set of all possible first-personally centred 
worlds, W1st, should either coincide with, or be some subset of, the set of all logically possible such 
pairs, formally, the product set W3rd ´ P, where W3rd is the set of all possible third-personal worlds 
and P is the universal set of all possible loci of subjectivity. However, if we wish to interpret W1st 
as the set of all genuinely possible worlds at the first-personal level – in either a metaphysical or a 
nomological sense – then W1st may well be smaller than the product set W3rd ´ P. Not every 
possible locus of subjectivity needs to be compatible with every possible third-personal world. In 
particular, we may hold different philosophical and/or scientific views about how the third-
personal facts encoded by a third-personal world w constrain the possible first-personal 
perspectives that may be paired with w. Generally, we can define a “psycho-physical law” as a 
specification of which pairs of the form áw,pñ are included in W1st and which are not. Different 
theories of consciousness may give us different such psycho-physical laws. 
It may be, for instance, that a locus of subjectivity must be suitably associated with an entity with 
a particular consciousness-supporting make-up, such as a living organism with a normally 
functioning brain. Or perhaps, as panpsychists argue, loci of subjectivity are more ubiquitous: first-
person perspectives could be attached to many other places in the world as well, beyond complex 
organisms like us.  
As I will now explain, one can re-interpret existing scientific theories of consciousness as 
specifications of which kinds of pairs áw,pñ are included in the set W1st and which not. Theories of 
consciousness proposed by neuroscientists and psychologists are often attempts to identify the 
neural or, more generally, physical correlates of consciousness. This is to say: they entail 
hypotheses to the effect that an organism or entity is phenomenally conscious if and only if its 
brain, or cognition, or functional make-up, satisfies such and such conditions. In the early 1990s, 
for example, Francis Crick and Christof Koch influentially proposed a theory according to which 
phenomenal consciousness occurs in any biological brain that displays certain patterns of 
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synchronized neural firing activity in a particular frequency range. 43  Others proposed that 
consciousness is associated with appropriate cognitive capacities, such as certain forms of higher-
order cognition.44 Each of these theories can be interpreted in present terms as a specification of 
which physically instantiated properties within the third-personal world are such that they give rise 
to a corresponding locus of subjectivity. Hence, we can think of them as specifications of which 
kinds of loci of consciousness p can be associated with any given third-personal world w.  
The theory that arguably comes closest to fitting the two-level (first-person / third-person) structure 
for the analysis of consciousness sketched in this paper is integrated information theory (“IIT”), 
as developed by Giulio Tononi and colleagues.45 This theory, too, offers an account of when a 
physical system gives rise to conscious experiences. It says that consciousness occurs in any 
physical system which instantiates a local maximum of informational integration, where this is an 
information-theoretic property that can, in principle, be defined for any physical system. 
Translated into the present terminology, IIT asserts that a locus of subjectivity π is paired with a 
third-personal world ω (i.e., W1st contains the pair áw,pñ) if and only if π is appropriately associated 
with some site of locally maximal informational integration in ω. A functionally awake human 
cortex is an example of such a site, while an ecosystem or a fridge is (presumably) not. 
IIT can be naturally subsumed under the metaphysical picture I have sketched. First of all, IIT’s 
starting point, unlike that of most other scientific theories of consciousness, is phenomenological 
rather than physicalist. In presenting the theory, Tononi and colleagues begin by specifying so-
called “axioms” that are intended to characterize the nature of first-person experience. They then 
seek to derive from those first-personal axioms some associated third-personal “postulates” 
concerning the consciousness-supporting physical conditions. This is where the claim that 
consciousness is associated with maximal informational integration comes into the picture. I do 
not wish to commit myself to any claims about whether IIT’s first-personal foundations or its 
derivation of the associated third-personal, information-theoretic correlates of consciousness are 
correct. All I want to note is that this picture is consistent with the metaphysical architecture I have 
sketched, in which the third-personal level supervenes on the first-personally centred level. If the 
metaphysical picture presented here turned out to be right, then IIT’s compatibility with it would 
be a good-making feature of that theory. 
8. Some lessons for the hard problem of consciousness 
To show how the many-worlds picture allows us to think about the hard problem of consciousness, 
let me return to the much-debated question of whether zombies are metaphysically possible. As 
already noted, a “zombie” is a hypothetical entity that is behaviourally and neurally 
indistinguishable from an ordinary human being like you and me, but which lacks first-person 
experiences. A zombie has the same third-personal properties as its conscious counterpart: its 
bodily make-up is the same, as is its brain-functioning; it behaves in the same way as you or I do. 
 
43 See Crick and Koch (1990). 
44 For a review and critical discussion, see Carruthers (2011). 
45 See, e.g., Tononi (2015) and Tononi and Koch (2015).  
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From the outside, we would be inclined to attribute the same psychological states and dispositions 
to it. Yet it lacks phenomenal consciousness. There is nothing it is like to be such an entity, as 
Thomas Nagel would put it. As I have also noted, no-one in the mainstream debate suggests that 
there are zombies in the real world. Rather, the debate concerns the question of whether the notion 
of a zombie is coherent. Are zombies metaphysically possible or not? In particular, could there be 
a possible duplicate of our world which is identical to the actual world in all physical respects, but 
in which no-one has any first-person experience? 
Let me use the term “zombie scenario” to refer to a scenario in which things are physically and 
third-personally indistinguishable from the actual world, but there is no first-personal 
consciousness. Is this scenario coherent? My analysis suggests that there is a sense in which it is 
coherent and another sense in which it isn’t. Perhaps the existence of these two senses is, in part, 
responsible for the hardness of the hard problem of consciousness.  
Let me begin with the sense in which the zombie scenario is coherent. I have argued that we can 
represent consciousness and its relation to the rest of the world in terms of a levelled ontology in 
which there is a first-personally centred level in addition to the third-personal level. Thus, we have 
a levelled ontology in which there are (at least) two levels: the one corresponding to W3rd and the 
one corresponding to W1st. Importantly, in this ontology, the first-personally centred level is 
subvenient, and the third-personal level supervenient, not the other way around. In principle, there 
could also be other, higher levels that supervene on W3rd, but this does not matter for present 
purposes. The structure is shown in Figure 1, with arrows indicating mappings from subvenient to 
supervenient levels. Now, I suggest that the zombie scenario, where there are only zombies and no 
conscious beings, corresponds to a different levelled ontology, in which the lower one of the two 
levels – the first-personally centred one – is absent. In other words, the zombie scenario is one in 
which the levelled ontology is truncated at the third-personal level, as shown in Figure 2. There is 
nothing perspectival, subjective, or first-personal that is subvenient here. Insofar as such a levelled 
ontology is coherent, the zombie scenario is also coherent. 
    
Figure 1: The standard scenario     Figure 2: The zombie scenario 
But there is another sense in which the zombie scenario is not coherent. On the picture I have 
sketched, it is clearly not meaningful to speak of “a world in which there are zombies”, if by “world” 
we mean “third-personal world”. Whether or not there are zombies depends, not on the features of 
any particular world in Ω3rd, but rather on whether the third-personal worlds in Ω3rd are 
underwritten, or realized, by any first-personally centred worlds in Ω1st. By definition, no features 
of a third-personal world could allow us to distinguish between zombies and non-zombies. Indeed, 
the third-personal worlds in the levelled ontology of Figure 1 are indistinguishable from those in 
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the levelled ontology of Figure 2. So, if we focus on third-personal worlds alone, there is nothing 
that would allow us to call them “zombie worlds” in Figure 2 but not in Figure 1.  
On the other hand, once we step inside any first-personally centred world, there is, by definition, 
a subject in that world: a first-personally centred world is a world with a subjective perspective. 
So, no properties of such a world could mark the distinction between zombies and non-zombies 
either. For this reason, the debate about whether there could be zombies is best interpreted, not as 
a debate about what properties there are in a given level-specific world, but rather as a debate about 
which levels there are in a levelled ontology; and the question of how phenomenal consciousness 
relates to the rest of our ontology is really a question about the ontological status of the first-
personal level, assuming there is such a level. 
In sum, there are two distinct ways in which we could understand the question of whether the 
zombie scenario is coherent. We could either interpret it as asking whether there could be
a world – whether third-personal or first-personal – in which there are zombies. Here, the answer 
must be “no”. At the third-personal level, the distinction between zombies and non-zombies cannot 
be drawn, and at the first-personal level, there is necessarily a conscious subject, around which the 
first-personal worlds are centred. Or we could alternatively interpret our question as asking 
whether there could be a levelled ontology in which there are zombies. Here, the answer is, in 
principle, “yes”, insofar as the levelled ontology shown in Figure 2 is coherent. But despite its 
coherence, this levelled ontology is clearly not the correct one for the predicament in which we 
find ourselves. We have no reason to doubt the existence of consciousness: we are conscious 
subjects. Of course, why this is so requires an answer, and this answer must ultimately be given 
by an appropriate psycho-physical law along the lines discussed in the previous section.46 
 
46 Philosophers of consciousness sometimes discuss the notion of a “ghost” as the conceptual opposite of a “zombie”: a 
hypothetical entity with phenomenal properties but no physical ones. Though no-one in the debate suggests that ghosts 
are nomologically possible, dualist theories render them metaphysically possible, so one might wonder what the present 
theory has to say about this issue. Here is one way one might approach the issue in analogy with my analysis of zombies. 
Let me use the term “ghost scenario” to refer to a scenario in which things are phenomenally indistinguishable from how 
they are in our present first-personally centred worlds, but there is nothing physical. Insofar as each first-personally 
centred world is a pair of the form áw,pñ, and the set W1st is equal to or included in W3rd ´ P, we may consider a levelled 
ontology that contains W1st as a subvenient level and P as a supervenient one (among other supervenient levels, such as 
W3rd), where the mapping from W1st to P maps each first-personally centred world áw,pñ to its p-component alone, 
interpretable as a “pure phenomenal world”. The latter is the totality of facts settled by the locus of subjectivity 
p alone. Figure 3 shows this levelled ontology. One might argue that the ghost scenario, in which there is nothing physical 
at all, corresponds to the levelled ontology shown in Figure 4, which is truncated at the “pure phenomenal level” P, 
where the worlds are of the form p rather than áw,pñ, and in which the richer first-personally centred level W1st is absent. 
                                                                     
Figure 3: The baseline scenario                                     Figure 4: The ghost scenario 
I do not claim that such a levelled ontology is plausible, but if it is coherent, one might argue that the ghost scenario 
is coherent too. I thank Daniel Stoljar for prompting me to address this issue. 
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9. Concluding remarks 
The aim of this paper has been to explore what I have called the “many-worlds theory of 
consciousness”. It combines three ingredients: 
 (i) the phenomenologically inspired idea that each conscious subject is associated with a 
  first-personally centred world that is present for him or her 
with  (ii) the Lewis-inspired idea of modal realism about such first-personally centred worlds, 
while  (iii) representing the overall picture as a levelled ontology with a subvenient first-person 
level and a supervenient third-person level, where third-personal worlds are “multiply 
realizable” at the first-personal level and consciousness doesn’t supervene on third-
personal properties. 
Although the theory resulting from these three ingredients may be heterodox, versions of each 
ingredient can be found elsewhere in the philosophical debate. As already noted, something similar 
to the first ingredient – though developed differently – can be found in Caspar Hare’s work on 
“egocentric presentism” and, without reference to centred worlds, in Ted Honderich’s work on 
“actualism”. Something similar to the second – though not in exactly the form proposed here – can 
be found in discussions of how consciousness fits into the many-worlds interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.47 The present many-worlds picture, however, is not tied to quantum mechanics. The 
many-world picture also fits Honderich’s characterization of each “subjective physical world” as 
being one “among very many, as many as there are sets of perceivings of single perceivers”, though, 
contrary to the picture I have sketched, Honderich thinks of subjective and objective physical 
worlds as being different parts of the physical world.48 The third ingredient is perhaps the least 
familiar, though the non-supervenience claim implied by it can be found in works on the 
explanatory and metaphysical gap between physical phenomena and conscious experience. David 
Chalmers, for instance, has influentially defended the view that conscious experience does not 
supervene on physical properties, but he doesn’t frame his argument in terms of a levelled ontology. 
That said, the proposed combination of the three ingredients is probably new or at least 
underexplored in the existing debate.49 
 
47 For instance, Chalmers (1996, ch. 10) suggests that his dualistic theory may be combined with Everett’s “many-
worlds” interpretation of quantum mechanics. He distinguishes between the “splitting-worlds” variant of the Everett 
view (a genuine “many-worlds” interpretation, which he rejects as a misinterpretation of Everett) and the “one-big-
world” variant (which he prefers). According to the latter, “[t]here is only one world, but it has more in it than we might 
have thought” (p. 347). Each conscious mind “perceives a separate discrete world, corresponding to the sort of world 
that we perceive – call this a miniworld, as opposed to the maxiworld of the superposition. The real world is a maxiworld, 
and the miniworlds are merely in the minds of the subjects” (ibid.). There would then still be a single world underlying 
all the different first-personal (mini)worlds. This differs from the many-worlds picture I have sketched here. Moreover, 
an Everett-inspired theory would seem to suggest that different conscious subjects correspond to the different 
constituent states within a quantum superposition. Although I do not rule out that the Everett interpretation of quantum 
mechanics may be defensible, I need not tie “many worlds” to quantum superpositions here. 
48 See Honderich (2014, pp. 192 and 226). 
49 As noted, the present theory also shares some ideas with Fine’s first-personal realism and Merlo’s subjectivism 
about the mental, but those other theories are not developed around an explicit centred-worlds architecture. There are 
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Finally, I would like to make a couple of technical remarks. One is that the present picture offers 
some resources for thinking about certain kinds of counteridentical conditionals such as “If I were 
such-and-such person, I would experience, feel, or do such-and-such”, especially in the context of 
empathizing with and relating to others. Counteridentical conditionals raise a number of 
difficulties and are sometimes interpreted as instances of counterpossible conditionals – 
conditionals with a necessarily false antecedent. According to the standard possible-worlds 
semantics, such conditionals would be vacuously true, which is an undesirable result. The present 
theory gives us a possible strategy for analyzing them. We might say – at least as a first simplistic 
stab – that the conditional “If I were such-and-such person, I would experience, feel, or do such-
and-such” is true at a given first-personally centred world if and only if its consequent is true at all 
nearest first-personally centred worlds at which the antecedent is true. In the simplest case, truth-
evaluating such a conditional would require shifting the locus of subjectivity from the one at my 
present first-personally centred world to the locus corresponding to the target subject, and then 
considering whether the consequent is true at that world. Of course, there are many potential 
subtleties and complications to which I cannot do justice here. For instance, while projecting 
myself into someone else’s perspective, I might assume that I still retain some of my own 
psychological or phenomenal characteristics. This would go against defining the nearest first-
personally centred world in which the antecedent is true simply as the one where my current locus 
of subjectivity is replaced by that of the target subject while the third-personal world remains the 
same. Rather, I would somehow need to shift my current locus of subjectivity to a hypothetical 
“hybrid” locus that is supposed to be suitably co-located with the target subject while retaining 
some aspects of my own subjectivity; in addition, some other features of the third-personal world 
might need to be adjusted too. In any case, I wish to note that the present framework gives us 
possible resources for thinking about at least some counteridentical conditionals in the context of 
relating to other minds.50  
The second technical remark I would like to make is that we could also set up the present formal 
framework in a slightly different way. Instead of defining first-personally centred worlds explicitly 
as pairs consisting of a third-personal world and a locus of subjectivity, as I have done, we could 
take first-personally centred worlds to be basic or primitive. We could then introduce two equivalence 
relations on the set W1st of first-personally centred worlds. One partitions W1st into equivalence classes 
of worlds that are third-personally equivalent. We could treat the set of such equivalence classes 
as the set of third-personal worlds, W3rd. A second relation partitions W1st into equivalence classes 
of worlds that are centred around the same subject. In effect, this would encode a criterion of 
 
also some similarities between the theory sketched here and the “subjective physicalism” of Tim Crane (2003) and 
Robert Howell (2016). As Crane notes, some well-known arguments against physicalism, such as Frank Jackson’s 
knowledge argument (1982), target “the view that all facts are … ‘book-learning’ facts: facts the learning of which 
[does] not require you to have a certain kind of experience or occupy a certain position in the world” (p. 78). Insofar 
as physicalism is committed to that view, those arguments speak against physicalism. Subjective physicalism, however, 
abandons the claim that all-facts are book-learning facts while retaining the claim that all facts – even those outside 
the book-learning category – are physical. Crane and Howell also discuss some parallels between indexical and 
phenomenal facts. While I agree with the quoted observations about book-learning facts, my analysis, as explained, 
pushes me further away from physicalism. The subjective physicalist theory still upholds the one-world picture. 
50 For recent studies of counteridenticals, see Kocurek (2018) and Kauf (2018); the latter invokes centred worlds.  
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personal identity. We could treat the set of such equivalence classes as the set of loci of subjectivity, 
P. This yields a similar structure as before, but without defining first-personally centred worlds 
explicitly as pairs of the form áw,pñ. Those phenomenologically oriented scholars for whom the 
first-personally centred level is the fundamental starting point might prefer this alternative setup. 
Although my discussion has been tentative and exploratory, and I have certainly not offered a 
conclusive defense of the many-worlds theory of consciousness, I hope to have said enough to 
motivate further discussion of it. 
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